Dentro de la obra madura de Spinoza, la _Ética_ y el _Tratado Teológico-Político _ se han analizado ampliamente. Sin embargo, el _Tratado Político_ ha sido menormente estudiado por ser una obra inconclusa y con problemas estructurales. Nosotros afirmamos que la teoría política más acabada de Spinoza se encuentra en el TP. En esta obra se sacan todas las consecuencias de guiarse por una noción estrictamente inmanente de la política. En ese sentido, el TP sigue de manera más coherente el programa (...) trazado por la doctrina fundamental de Spinoza expuesta en la _Ética_, y no el TTP. Esto nos lleva a la consideración de la política como tendencia en dos direcciones opuestas: ampliación de poder y concentración de poder. (shrink)

This is a literature review study, of unemployment which is widespread in today's societies, where individuals with work capacity, find themselves without employment activity due to a lack of opportunities or simply because they cannot find a job. The research aims to learn and understand the causes of unemployment and underemployment in Ecuador, particularly in the Province of Chimborazo during the years 2021-2022. To achieve this we have relied on the collection of statistical data and its subsequent analysis, interpretation, judgment, (...) and prospection, which provides a base tool for decision-making, as well as for academic and business deepening. (shrink)

El objetivo de este texto es ofrecer una visión de la academia que vaya más allá de las dinámicas del capital, dando cuenta de la pertinencia de la filosofía dentro de las universidades. Para hacerlo, en primer lugar, situaremos nuestro contexto posterior a la muerte de Dios anunciada por Nietzsche. Con esto en mente, rescataremos los planteamientos de Heidegger en La autoafirmación de la Universidad alemana. Posteriormente, a la propuesta heideggeriana de la filosofía como eje de las disciplinas universitarias se (...) le dará un giro nietzscheano, integrando la jovialidad en su quehacer. A lo largo de todo el texto, con ayuda de algunos pensadores contemporáneos como Jean-Luc Nancy, Jacques Derrida, Stephen Melville e Iain Thomas, haremos entonces un llamado a la configuración de un tipo de filosofía en la actualidad que asuma el riesgo que comporta hacerse cargo de la existencia en su vaivén permanente, entre tragedia y comedia, entre razón y sinrazón. Finalmente, daremos cuenta de la forma en que el capital se apropia del sinsentido de la existencia, llenándolo con razones y medidas. Por lo tanto, concluiremos que sólo desde la multiplicidad de las voces en torno a estas cuestiones existenciales es que podremos hacer frente al actual sistema de mercado y su tendencia a co-optar todos nuestros saberes. (shrink)

Mostramos el valor de los estudios biográficos para comprender los modos de ser sujetos en comunidades de diversa tolerancia hacia las prácticas homoeróticas. El texto reflexiona sobre la constitución de comunidades imaginarias a partir de trabajos etnográficos en comunidades indígenas; la participación de medios de comunicación; las injerencias de ONG sobre la comunidad zapoteca, en especial en Juchitán, tierra de tolerancias sexual hacia los muxes. Los muxes cumplen diversas tares sociales y culturales, son hombres con prácticas homoeróticas con otros hombres (...) que ni ellos ni el grupo social considera homosexuales. Los zapotecas forman parte de los grupos originarios del sur de México, tienen fuerte presencia en el país en su conjunto, desarrollan prácticas de amplia participación de la mujer, tanto así que algunos científicos sociales la han denominado cultura matriarcal. En el presente documento se discuten seis asuntos sobre la región a partir de argumentos generados por un miembro de amplio reconocimiento en la región de Juchitán: 1) la valoración del rol de la mujer al considerar que es un grupo con prácticas matriarcales; 2) el mito del paraíso de la izquierda; 3) el mito del paraíso gay; 4) la idea de un tercer sexo; 5) la idea de aceptación generalizada de los muxes; 6) la generalización del travestismo. Finalmente, se plantean algunos efectos de la intervención de los científicos sociales, de los medios de difusión masiva y de las ONG sobre la profesionalización del pueblo para dar respuesta a la diversidad de intereses de los externos a la comunidad. (shrink)

This paper investigates the historical origin and ancestors of typicality, which is now a central concept in Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanics and Bohmian Mechanics. Although Ludwig Boltzmann did not use the word typicality, its main idea, namely, that something happens almost always or is valid for almost all cases, plays a crucial role for his explanation of how thermodynamic systems approach equilibrium. At the beginning of the 20th century, the focus on almost always or almost everywhere was fruitful for developing measure (...) theory and probability theory. It was apparently Hugh Everett III who first mentioned typicality in physics in 1957 while searching for a justification of the Born rule in his interpretation of quantum mechanics. The historically closest concept before these developments is moral certainty, which was invented by the medieval French theologian Jean Gerson, and it became a standard concept at least until the Age of Enlightenment, when Jakob Bernoulli proved the Law of Large numbers. (shrink)

This article rescues the original theory of violence that Jean-Paul Sartre developed in the late forties in Notebooks for an Ethics (1983). Notebooks is a posthumous and unfinished work in which the philosopher outlined the ethics promised in the last pages of Being and Nothingness. In this unfinished moral philosophy, violence is phenomenologically described as a human enterprise, freely chosen in an existential situation, which possesses the following essential features: the intransigent attitude, the destructive function, the dissociation of ends and (...) means, the rupture of bonds of solidarity, the magical belief, the self-justification, the demand and the devaluation of the freedom of others. The main objective of this article is to reconstruct this theory so that it is possible to judge its value today in the philosophical problem of defining what violence is. (shrink)

At least for those who uphold the rationality of morality, ethics and practical reason are not two distinct topics: an ethically sound agent is one whose practical reason functions as it should. Take, for instance, the greatest historical figures. Aristotle claimed that no virtue of character can exist without practical wisdom—the excellence of practical, deliberative reason. And Kant thought that the categorical imperative, the ultimate moral principle that governs a good will, was at the same time the fundamental principlof practical (...) reasoning because the will simply ispractical reason. Even before any philosophical theory of the connection between acting well and the exercise of a rational power is in view, our moral practices strongly suggest that there is one. For we take it for granted that, in an important range of cases, when an agent fails to act as she should, something has gone awry with the agent and not just with her acts, and, furthermore, that the agent herself may be held responsible for this. In calling an agent who acts unethically "irrational," we are saying these two things. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene por objetivo analizar la equidad natural como criterio de interpretación jurídica. Contadas las excepciones, es posible aseverar que no ha sido objeto de un estudio sistemático y profundo por parte de filosofía del Derecho; no existe claridad respecto a cómo funciona la equidad natural, cuál es su naturaleza, cómo se aplica, si acaso es un concepto moral, jurídico o participa de ambas categorías. Frente a este panorama en este trabajo se busca responder a estas interrogantes, proponiendo un (...) análisis de las propiedades que constituyen la idea de equidad interpretativa. Ello no para alcanzar una definición final, sino para entregar claridad conceptual a los operadores jurídicos cuando hacen uso de este elemento hermenéutico. Para lograr este objetivo se realizará un análisis crítico de la bibliografía especializada en el tema, con la finalidad de repensar ciertos lugares comunes en torno a este concepto. (shrink)

Good-willed or morally worthy action is one that is morally right non-accidentally: as she performs it the agent is, in some way, responsive to its rightness. Several recent accounts have analyzed good-willed action in terms of a composition of right action plus some requirements on the agent’s psychological condition, but tend to leave unexamined the direction of conceptual dependence between right action and good-willed action. I argue that significant difficulties arise when right action is taken as primary and intelligible independently (...) of good-willed action, often relying on the standard causalist picture of agency. Inspired by Aristotle’s notion of virtuous action and Kant’s treatment of action from duty, I sketch an alternative view in which the idea of mere rightness is conceptually dependent on that of a good-willed self-conscious action done for reasons. (shrink)

El lenguaje "excesivo" de Lévinas apunta a un "exceso" reflexivo en la cultura actual. Porque "exceso" es querer pensar la Trascendencia, la presencia del Otro y del otro, la radicalidad de la responsabilidad moral y la fundamentación última de la libertad. "Exceso" de lenguaje, "exceso" de pensamiento que, quizá, la cultura de hoy necesita para recuperar la búsqueda de la verdad.

En el presente trabajo se indica que es en los filósofos modernos en los que se encuentra lo que podría llamarse "antecedentes" de la globalización actual, y entre ellos, particularmente en Kant. Sin embargo, la globalización ha discurrido por vías de hecho cuya legitimidad no es congruente con la demanda moral kantiana.

Este artigo trata da formação moral do homem segundo Kant. Para ele, “o homem, afetado por tantas inclinações, é na verdade capaz de conceber a idéia de uma razão pura prática, mas não é tão facilmente dotado da força necessária para a tornar eficaz in concreto no seu comportamento”. Deste modo, para implementar nossas máximas de comportamento Kant elabora seu estudo sobre a formação do homem para levá-lo a uma vida livre e moral.

: Autonomous driving systems promise important changes for future of transport, primarily through the reduction of road accidents. However, ethical concerns, in particular, two central issues, will be key to their successful development. First, situations of risk that involve inevitable harm to passengers and/or bystanders, in which some individuals must be sacrificed for the benefit of others. Secondly, and identification responsible parties and liabilities in the event of an accident. Our work addresses the first of these ethical problems. We are (...) interested in investigating how humans respond to critical situations and what reactions they consider to be morally right or at least preferable to others. Our experimental approach relies on the trolley dilemma and knowledge gained from previous research on this. More specifically, our main purpose was to test the difference between what human drivers actually decide to do in an emergency situations whilst driving a realistic simulator and the moral choices they make when they pause to consider what they would do in the same situation and to better understand why these choices may differs. Keywords: Self-driving Cars; Trolley Problem; Moral Choices; Moral Responsibility; Virtual Reality Dilemmi morali nelle automobili a guida autonoma Riassunto: I sistemi di guida autonomi promettono importanti cambiamenti per il futuro dei trasporti, principalmente attraverso la riduzione degli incidenti stradali. Tuttavia, vi sono preoccupazioni etiche, in particolare due questioni centrali, fondamentali per il loro sviluppo. In primo luogo, le situazioni di rischio che comportano inevitabili danni ai passeggeri e/o ai pedoni, ovvero situazioni in cui alcune persone devono essere sacrificate a beneficio di altri. In secondo luogo, l’identificazione delle parti responsabili in caso di incidente. Il nostro lavoro affronta il primo di questi problemi etici. Siamo interessati a studiare come gli umani rispondono a situazioni critiche e quali reazioni considerano moralmente giuste o almeno preferibili. Il nostro approccio sperimentale si basa sul trolley problem e sulle conoscenze acquisite da precedenti ricerche su questo ambito. Più specificamente, il nostro scopo principale è quello di testare la differenza tra ciò che i conducenti umani decidono effettivamente di fare in una situazione di emergenza, mentre guidano un simulatore realistico, e le scelte morali che compiono se posti nella stessa situazione e hanno la possibilità di decidere senza limiti di tempo. Lo scopo è inoltre comprendere come e perché queste scelte possono differire. Parole chiave: Automobili a guida autonoma; Trolley problem; Scelte morali; Responsabilità morale, Realtà virtuale. (shrink)

Ethical intuitionism traces its roots back to the early eighteenth century in the field of ethics. Despite apparent distinctions, intuitionism, especially in its recent development by Huemer, bears a striking resemblance to robust versions of rationalist foundationalism. In this paper, we will argue against the perspective of robust intuitionism. Furthermore, we commit to reviewing what theorists operating within the field of study known as Dual Process Theory hypothesize about intuition. Nonetheless, we do not claim that the origin of our moral (...) beliefs is unreliable or discreditable. On the contrary, we entertain the prospect of reviving intuitionistic themes by leveraging the concept of a Kantian scheme. (shrink)

Hart’s criticism of Devlin’s stance on the legal enforcement of morality has been highly influential in shaping a new liberal sensibility and in paving the way to many important legal reforms in the UK. After 50 years it is perhaps time to go back to Law, Liberty and Morality to see it in the perspective of the general evolution of Hart’s thought since the early 50s. This is a period of extraordinary creativity for the Oxford philosopher, in which he writes (...) many important contributions to legal, moral and political philosophy. Prominent among these is ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’, an article that sets the agenda for Hart’s subsequent work on liberty, fairness and rights, and provides the philosophical background for the liberal understanding of the relations between law and morality defended in Law, Liberty and Morality. (shrink)

The Bible recounts that in Eden, Adam gives names to all the animals. But those names are not only representations of the animals’ nature, rather they shape and constitute it. The naming by Adam contains in itself the divide between the human and non-human. Then, there is the Fall: Adam falls and forgets Being. Though he may still remember the names he gave to the animals in Eden, he is no longer sure about their meaning. Adam will have to try (...) to remember his own intentions. Through this effort he can also become aware of how he thinks, who he is, and what was the natural order he knew before the Fall. Medieval bestiaries tell us this story. Bestiaries are works of word play populated by animal figures. They depend on back-and-forth anthropomorphization, or circular metaphor. Animal figures are portrayed as both a mirror of human nature and a window on it. Bestiaries served as means for the moral education of human beings and, at the same time, a way to criticize the current state of humanity, including political and ethical habits. Within the moral irony of medieval bestiaries we can find the origin of the invented nature that modernity will try, subsequently, to insert into natural rights discourse through the teleological oxymoron of their naturalized and naturalizing counter-factuality. I will propose a historical-semiotic journey through the ironic representations of the human-beasts from the ancient world to contemporaneity. The proposal resulting from this cultural excursion is that the words included in the many national and international Rights declarations operate much like the names Adam gave to the animals and still more as they were re-read in medieval bestiaries, both textual and musical. So, can the words of Rights still serve as musical scores, open to an infinite play of re-signification? If we were able to overcome the modern culture/nature and human being/animal dualisms, we could cast, today as in the past, a zoological gaze on human rights by means of contemporary bestiaries and, in this way, perhaps find the gist of rights’ names and our ever regained and ever lost again humanity. (shrink)

The recent discussions on the unity of virtue suffer from a lack of reference to the processes through which we interpret each other as moral agents. In the present paper it is argued that much light can be thrown on that crucial issue by appealing to a version of Donald Davidson’s Principle of Charity, which we call “Principle of Phronetic Charity”. The idea is that in order to treat somebody as a moral agent, one has first to attribute to them, (...) at least pro tempore, a significant degree of practical wisdom and, then, to assess and rationally adjust such attribution of competence via actual engagement with them – a process that may lead to different responses on the part of the interpreter. After expounding and defending the Principle of Phronetic Charity and the interpretive practices connected with it, we discuss the repercussions of our account on the issue of the epistemic access to virtue. We will show, in particular, that some important components of both disunitarianism and unitarianism have to be retained: in accordance with the former, we stress the role of concrete experience over pure speculation and, up to a point, the idea that virtues tend to form variegated ensembles; in accordance with the latter, we accept the claim that virtues are not attributed to moral agents in isolation. Ultimately, however, the account developed here rejects both the atomism of the disunitarian view and the holism of the “Unity of the Virtues”, since it is in fact a form of molecularism, according to which virtues come neither individually nor as a whole, but rather as clusters. (shrink)

This article discusses two general strategies that have been pursued to explain how moral thought and moral institutions might have emerged. The first is found in the tradition of those whom Nietzsche calls "English psychologists"; the second is Nietzsche's own. I begin by giving an account of the resources of "English" genealogy as represented by Paul Rée and especially Charles Darwin. On the basis of that discussion, I consider Nietzsche's objections to English genealogy in detail. I argue that as they (...) stand, these objections are inconclusive; while they are, at least to a certain extent, effective against Rée, they fail as objections to the fundamental insights of Darwin. Moreover, I argue that on reflection, the rival genealogy that Nietzsche puts forward is not nearly as well supported and cannot plausibly bear the weight of explanation alone. Finally, I ask what this entails for our conception of ethical emotion. (shrink)

Questions of boosting human potential and biomedical techniques by modifying the normal way in which the human body works. This text first explains this phenomenon then reflects on it, drawing on philosophy, bioethics, law and technology.

Many people want to spend the last stages of their lives at home, in familiar surroundings, and possibly with people they know. However, this increasing desire on the part of older, ill, or even dying people also makes support from other people unavoidable, which in many cases involves family members, loved ones, or even friends. These family caregivers care for the person concerned, even though they lack the professional skills of nursing staff, for example, and have usually not been prepared (...) for this task. This article focuses on the ethical significance of the moral identity of family caregivers. While the effects of this care constellation on the caregivers have often been discussed in the scientific literature, ethical considerations regarding moral identity have so far been neglected. In the first step, the question of what is actually meant by the term moral identity is examined. The second step shifts attention to those people who have taken on the care of a loved one. The relevance of this previously discussed identity is emphasized by using study results and work in this context, and placed in relation to family caregivers. The third step shows that (1) moral identity must be understood as a necessary prerequisite for adequate and humane care, (2) this identity can be enhanced through the caregiving relationship, and (3) the activities undertaken by family caregivers reveal their moral identity. These considerations are finally summarized, provided with ethical aspects, and awareness of this important work of family caregivers is raised. (shrink)

By dovetailing the classical concepts of virtue, beauty, harmony and happiness with the cardinal values of modern imagination, life and freedom, Agnes Heller galvanizes modernity's anthropological reflexivity and hints at the prospect of a classicism pertinent to the present. Beyond nostalgia for an ancient past or apology for a contemporary present, her moral anthropology is approached via a dialectical elucidation of aspects of epicurean theory attuned to modernity's complexity. Under the contemporary condition of waning postmodern challenges, escalating confusion and cynicism, (...) moral anthropology's task is as one of probing modernity's destiny for a non-predatory humanism that combines the existential wisdom of ancient theory with modern values. (shrink)

In present times, social changes affect our ethos; it is a time plenty of issues and disputes on traditional ethical conceptions as well as on present ones which try to give ethical responses to new situations. With the aim of exploring a possibility of thinking our present, I will here try to explore the interpretation matrix with which modern ethos has been articulated, and which -with some modifications- still finds its way into present times. Starting from this precision, I will (...) move forward along a route of inquiry which opens up to us when we do not place ourselves from the point of view of "God's eye", i.e., when we cease to focus our reflections on what I have called the theological problem of modernity, and instead deal with the problem of the social construction of moral norms. The attempt to give reason of a secular moral position -freed from the presuppositionsof the beginnings of modern times- will lead to the distinction between moral, understood as a human group's customs and habits and ethics as the critique of established moral. I will hold that the construction of moral norms comes into play in the tension between moral and ethics.En nuestro presente, los cambios sociales afectan a nuestro ethos, así como abundan los cuestionamientos y disputas sobre las concepciones éticas tradicionales y también sobre las actuales propuestas que intentan dar respuestas éticas a las nuevas situaciones. Con el objeto de explorar una posibilidad de pensar nuestra actualidad, trataré aquí de precisar la matriz de interpretación con la que se ha articulado el ethos moderno y que perdura con modificaciones hasta nuestros días. A partir de tal precisión, avanzaré por un camino de indagación que se abre cuando no nos ubicamos en la perspectiva del "ojo de Dios", esto es, cuando dejamos de centrar la reflexión en el que he llamado problema teológico de la modernidad, para ocuparnos del problema de la construcción social de las normas morales. El intento por dar cuenta de una moral secular que no quede lastrada con presupuestos de los inicios de la modernidad, llevará a diferenciar entre la moral, entendida como los usos y costumbres de un grupo humano, y la ética como crítica de la moral establecida. En la tensión entre moral y ética sostendré que se juega la construcción de las normas morales. (shrink)

During the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in Italy, practitioners had to make tragic decisions regarding the allocation of scarce resources in the ICU. The Italian debate has paid a lot of attention to identifying the specific regulatory criteria for the allocation of resources in the ICU; in this paper, however, we argue that deciding such criteria is not enough for the implementation of fair and transparent allocative decisions. In this respect, we discuss three ethical issues: (a) in the (...) Italian context, the treating physician, rather than a separate committee, was generally the one responsible for the allocation decision; (b) although many allocative guidelines have supported moral equivalence between withholding and withdrawing treatments, some health professionals have continued to consider it a morally problematic aspect; and (c) the health workers who have had to make the aforementioned decisions or even only worked in ICU during the pandemic often experienced moral distress. We conclude by arguing that, even if these problems are not directly related to the above-mentioned issues of distributive justice, they can nevertheless directly affect the quality and ethics of the implementation of allocative criteria, regardless of those chosen. (shrink)

This paper studies the lessons of principled anti-corruption experts who dared to fulfill their duty of justice in highly corrupt societies, through the true story of Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the former Finance Minister of Nigeria. My thesis is that when principled anti-corruption experts are epistemic trespassers, they show moral incompetence. Okonjo-Iweala shows moral incompetence in two ways: she misread the opposition to her strategies and misled other honest reformers. Both actions bungled her efforts to eradicate corruption inasmuch as they hindered the (...) possibility of finding successful anti-corruption policies. Okonjo-Iweala’s moral incompetence is, I argue, the result of her epistemic trespassing that led her to act like an expert in an environment where she was not. I conclude that, in highly corrupt societies, principled anti-corruption experts should embrace moral humility, stop thinking that they are experts, and act more like students, asking questions and not rushing to think that they understand the answers. (shrink)

The paper offers a twofold intervention in the debates about the paradox of fiction. First, it argues that too much emphasis has been placed on the paradox’ epistemological aspect. This has led to a neglect of its ethical dimension. Specifically, little has been said about the ethical issues of regularly caring for fictional entities while exhibiting comparatively far less concern for real­life fellow men and women. Second, the essay argues that it is often the case that it is real­life structures (...) rather than fictional entities that cause emotions. In the case of horror, for example, we are not afraid of the fictional monster but of an off possibility that something like this might exist in the real world. Importantly, the proposal differs from the counterfactualist approaches because it allows that fictional entities may cause emotions. Specifically, emotions which do not have clearly defined accompanying typical actions, such as sympathy and antipathy. (shrink)

Should businesses engage in moral talk when it becomes profitable? Due to their particular position of visibility, it is reasonable to acknowledge that businesses have specific moral duties. Some might argue that companies ought to help abandon morally repugnant norms by providing examples of alternative behaviors through advertisements. However, the moral talk of businesses might unexpectedly reinforce repugnant norms and increase social tensions in a polarized society. Then, the duty of the companies is not fulfilled when they engage in moral (...) talk. In polarized societies, the positional duty of businesses implies decreasing the risk of social conflict. It is not clear how to do that, yet I argue that if businesses use moral talk with mass marketing strategies, they would strive to shape impartial moral messages aiming to find points of moral convergence among polarized moral positions, which might mitigate social polarization. I call this duty the imperative of doux commerce. (shrink)

Mario Bunge, author of the monumental Treatise on Basic Philosophy, is widely renowned as a philosopher of science. In this new and ambitious work he shifts his attention to the social sciences and the social technologies. He considers a number of disciplines, including anthropology, sociology, economics, political science, law, history, and management science. Bunge contends that social science research has fallen prey to a postmodern fascination with irrationalism and relativism. He urges social scientists to re-examine the philosophy and the (...) methodology at the base of their discipline. Bunge calls for objective and relevant fact-finding, rigorous theorizing, and empirical testing, as well as morally sensitive and socially responsible policy design. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: I. METAPHYSICS -- 1. How Do Realism, Materialism, and Dialectics Fare in Contemporary Science? -- 2. New Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous -- 3. Energy: Between Physics and Metaphysics -- 4. The Revival of Causality -- 5. Emergence and the Mind -- 6 SCIENTIFIC REALISM -- 6. The Status of Concepts -- 7. Popper's Unworldly World 3 --II. METHODOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE -- 8. On Method in the Philosophy of Science -- 9. Induction in Science (...) -- 10. The GST Challenge to the Classical Philosophies of Science -- 11. The Power and Limits of Reduction -- 12. Thinking in Metaphors --III. PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS -- 13. Moderate Mathematical Fictionism -- 14. The Gap between Mathematics and Reality -- 15. Two Faces and Three Masks of Probability --IV. PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICS -- 16. Physical Relativity and Philosophy -- 17. Hidden Variables, Separability, and Realism -- 18. Schrodinger's Cat Is Dead --V. PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY -- 19. From Mindless Neuroscience and Brainless Psychology to Neuropsychology -- 20. Explaining Creativity -- VI. PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE -- 21. Analytic Philosophy of Society and Social Science: -- The Systemic Approach as an Alternative to Holism and Individualism -- 22. Rational Choice Theory: A Critical Look at Its Foundations -- 23. Realism and Antirealism in Social Science --VII. PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY -- 24. The Nature of Applied Science and Technology -- 25. The Technology-Science-Philosophy Triangle in Its Social Context -- 26. The Technologies in Philosophy --VIII. MORAL PHILOSOPHY -- 27. A New Look at Moral Realism -- 28. Rights Imply Duties --IX. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY -- 29. Morality Is the Basis of Legal and Political Legitimacy -- 30. Technoholodemocracy: An Alternative to -- Capitalism and Socialism -- Bibliography -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects. (shrink)

Most social scientists and philosophers claim that sociology and philosophy are disjoint fields of inquiry. Some have wondered how to trace the precise boundary between them. Mario Bunge argues that the two fields are so entangled with one another that no demarcation is possible or, indeed, desirable. In fact, sociological research has demonstrably philosophical pre-suppositions. In turn, some findings of sociology are bound to correct or enrich the philosophical theories that deal with the world, our knowledge of it, or (...) the ways of acting upon it. While Bunge's thesis would hardly have shocked Mill, Marx, Durkheim, or Weber, it is alien to the current sociological mainstream and dominant philosophical schools. Bunge demonstrates that philosophical problematics arise in social science research. A fertile philosophy of social science unearths critical presuppositions, analyzes key concepts, refines effective research strategies, crafts coherent and realistic syntheses, and identifies important new problems. Bunge examines Marx's and Durkheim's thesis that social facts are as objective as physical facts; the so-called Thomas theorem that refutes the behaviorist thesis that social agents react to social stimuli rather than to the way we perceive them; and Merton's thesis on the ethos of basic science which shows that science and morality are intertwined. He considers selected philosophical problems raised by contemporary social studies and argues forcefully against tolerance of shabby work in academic social science and philosophy alike. (shrink)